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Utilization of Rules 614
and 706 in Fact-Finding:
A Recent Study of Midwest Judges
Andrew W. Jurs

J

udges who are deciding contested issues in their courtrooms have an immense toolbox of potential methods at
their disposal. Many of these are commonplace methods,
used on a day-to-day basis for common issues in litigation. Pretrial conferences come to mind as an example in this regard.
But for those issues involving complex science, a judge has
choices to make on how to perform his or her important gatekeeping role, and those gatekeeping tools may be more rarely
used.
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court chose to review
admissibility of scientific evidence in the landmark case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.1 In that case, the court
declared that district court judges must act as a gatekeeper for
admissibility of scientific evidence, to determine the relevance
and reliability of expert evidence before its admission. Further
caselaw affirmed and expanded the original Daubert holding,
ensuring trial judges had maximum flexibility to perform the
gatekeeping function.2
So what tools do judges actually use to perform their gatekeeping role, and how often do they do so? During those years
when the Court was scrutinizing scientific evidence in Daubert
and other related decisions, several studies examined the issue
of gatekeeping methodology in both state and federal courts.
These studies relied on surveys performed before the end of
the Daubert trilogy, at a time when many states had either
recently shifted their standard to Daubert or had yet to do so.
Considering the age of the studies, updated analysis seems
timely.
In a recent survey, I asked state-court judges about their use
of what I will call “advanced fact-finding techniques.” By this
term, I am referring to those techniques that are often used for
gatekeeping purposes with complex evidence. Specifically, I
wanted to look at the methods contained within the Rules of
Evidence—questions from the bench and independent
experts—which had been endorsed by Justice Breyer for gatekeeping complex expert evidence.3 Considering this high-level
endorsement of these methods, I reasoned that judges might be
more likely to use them now that Daubert has taken hold. By
surveying judges, I hoped to explain what is actually going on
in courtrooms today.

This article is an abridged and revised version of a report of the
author’s study originally published as Questions from the Bench and
Independent Experts: A Study of the Practices of State Court Judges, 74
U. PITT. L. REV. 47 (2012).
Footnotes
1. Daubert v. Merrell Down Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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I intended the survey to answer the following questions:
• Are judges using these techniques?
• If so, how often?
• What specifically are the judges using the techniques to
do? and
• Why are some methods unlikely to be used?
In collecting answers to these questions, the survey could
inform judges whether their use of techniques is typical by
explaining what other judges do in their courtrooms and why.
The results would also be helpful in debating the efficacy of the
current methodologies in the Rules of Evidence and could
raise a policy question of whether modifications are in order.
Finally, the survey touches on how the gatekeeping role—as
envisioned by the Daubert trilogy—may be changing judicial
practice.
This article will discuss these issues in detail by examining
the prior research in the area, explaining the survey design,
and finishing with the survey results and a discussion of their
implications. By asking judges about the methods they use in
their courtrooms, this survey can explore the methodologies of
judging, advanced fact-finding techniques and their use, and
whether the methodologies endorsed by the Supreme Court
match courtroom reality today.
RESEARCH ON JUDICAL METHODOLGIES SINCE
DAUBERT

In the 1990s debate over “junk science” and judicial management of complex evidence, scant attention had been paid to
the methodologies of judicial gatekeeping. The Daubert trilogy
clearly established the substantive burden to admit evidence in
federal court, rejecting the Frye general-acceptance test for the
twin inquiries of relevance and reliability from the Federal
Rules of Evidence.4 But the court generally had little to say on
the management of complex science in the courtroom.
In the Joiner decision, Justice Breyer did offer some
thoughts on managing gatekeeping. In his concurrence, Breyer
suggested four different methods for judges to use in the gatekeeping of expert evidence. Two methods were from the Rules
of Civil Procedure—pretrial conferences and special masters—

2. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997) (finding
abuse of discretion as the correct standard for appellate review of
trial-court gatekeeping). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (expanding gatekeeping review to technical experts in addition to traditional scientific fields).
3. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
4. FED. R. EVID. 702. See supra text accompanying notes 2 & 3.

while the other two were from the Rules of Evidence—questions from the bench and independent experts.5 With barely
more than a paragraph to explain how he proposed judges perform the gatekeeping task demanded of them, Breyer and the
Court left it largely to the judges to figure out effective methods of evaluating expert evidence.
Around the same time as Joiner, several research groups
inquired into the methodology of judicial decision making. In
1998, Carol Krafka and her research team surveyed federal
judges to measure methods used in the courtroom.6 Judges
were asked about their use of a wide variety of techniques,
including independent judicial research, special masters, questions from the bench, pretrial conferences, and independent
experts. When the survey results were published in 2002, the
researchers had found which techniques were common, which
were uncommon, and which remained unused.
Krafka found that federal judges were very likely to question experts from the bench, with 93.6% having used the technique and only 6.4% stating they did not use that method at
all.7 Compare that result to the use of independent experts and
one can see a stark contrast. A large majority of federal
judges—74%—said they would never consider appointing an
independent expert, with a majority of the remaining 26%
believing it was appropriate only in cases with complex testimony.8 With their study, Krafka and her colleagues recorded
the use patterns of the federal judiciary right at the time of the
Daubert trilogy.
State-court judges would also be surveyed, by Shirley Dobbin and her colleagues in 1999.9 In many ways, the state-court
judges had similar responses to the federal judges. For example,
a large majority of judges had questioned an expert from the
bench, with only 18% stating they would not use this method.10
In contrast, state judges appeared more likely than their federal
counterparts to use independent experts, with just 57% stating
they would never use the method and 31% saying they would.11
Of note to this study, the research did not divide the state judges
into groups based on their state admissibility standard.

The combined effect of Krafka’s and Dobbin’s work was to
establish the methodologies of judicial gatekeeping during the
Daubert trilogy. Each study asked judges about the use of specific methods in their courtroom, showing that the likelihood
of the use of different techniques moving forward varied significantly.
You might be thinking, “So with these prior studies, why is
it necessary to survey judges again?” Several reasons necessitated an updated survey of methodologies of judicial gatekeeping.
First, the surveys for Krafka’s and Dobbin’s work date to
1998 and 1999. Of course, these were essential in learning
what methods judges used around the time of Joiner. With over
a dozen years having passed since, though, the situation has
changed. At the time of many these surveys, the Daubert trilogy was not yet completed, as Kumho Tire v. Carmichael would
be decided in March 1999.12 Since the Kumho decision
expanded the gatekeeping role to nonscientific technical
expertise, judges might have had to rethink which techniques
they were likely to use after that decision.
Second, at least for many state-court judges, the critical decision on the substantive standard for judicial gatekeeping was
not Daubert but instead occurred afterward when their state
supreme courts addressed the state standard for admission of
expert evidence. In the years after Daubert, many states followed the Supreme Court to a Rule 702 standard.13 Other
states, faced with the same choice, did not.14 Since the issue was
changing rapidly in the 1990s, both on the state and federal
level, the judicial responses from that era may have measured
use of a system that has since changed, or may have asked
judges about gatekeeping methods prior to Daubert taking hold
in judges’ states. Over a decade later, the scientific-admissibility
standard in most states has remained stable for many years,
engendering a stasis lacking in those earlier years.15
Third, recent research suggests judges might be having difficulty with some of the gatekeeping required under Daubert
and similar state rules.16 If so, establishing the methods that

5. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (pretrial conferences); FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (special
masters); FED. R. EVID. 614; FED. R. EVID. 706.
6. Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and
Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309 (2002)
7. Id. at 326.
8. Id.
9. Shirley A. Dobbin et al., Federal and State Trial Judges on the Proffer and Presentation of Expert Evidence, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2007).
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id.
12. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
13. For a list of states that have adopted a Daubert-type analysis, see
Alice B. Lustre, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453
(2001). See also DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE - EXPERT
EVIDENCE §6.4.2.a n.16 (2d ed. 2010).
14. For a list of remaining Frye states, see KAYE ET AL., supra note 13,
at §6.4.2.a n.17; Lustre, supra note 13, at 453. These states
include: California (People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994)),

Florida (Flanagan v. State, 625 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1993)), Illinois
(People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2000)), New York (People v.
Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994)), and Pennsylvania (Grady v.
Frito-Lay, 839 A.2d 1038 (Pa. 2003)).
15. Of course, there are some exceptions in which a state changed its
scientific-admissibility standard more recently. See Brian Pollock
& Tore Mowatt-Larssen, Arizona’s Adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702: Life Under the New, Old, Daubert Standard, 48 ARIZONA
ATTORNEY 42 (2012) (Arizona adopts a Daubert-like approach in
2012); Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391 (Mich.
2004) (Michigan adopts a Daubert-like approach in 2004); Mississippi Transportation Commission v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31
(Miss. 2003) (Mississippi adopts a Daubert-like approach in
2005); Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001)
(Nebraska adopts Daubert-like approach in 2001).
16. Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. &
POL’Y 19, 19-20 (2007); see, e.g., Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking
the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442
(2001) (judges split on whether they believe they have the necessary background to handle scientific evidence in their courtroom).
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are currently being used is critical to understanding if policy
changes are in order.
Finally, an updated study can measure two things not previously analyzed in detail. Dobbin’s survey of state-court
judges explained their use of techniques in detail, but the survey did not examine whether judges’ use of methods changed
based on their “home” scientific-admissibility standard.17 Second, neither Krafka nor Dobbin asked judges to explain why
one technique—the use of independent experts—was so
unlikely to be used. In one survey, sent before Daubert,
researchers Joe Cecil and Thomas Willging had asked that
question and found that reluctance to appoint experts was
based on the rarity of cases necessitating an independent
expert.18 Both this finding and the issue of scientific-admissibility standards could be examined in an updated survey.
STUDY DESIGN

To learn about judicial use of advanced fact-finding
methodologies, I needed both a sample of judges and a survey
questionnaire.
I began by selecting judges for the survey. To start, I chose
states that would be in a similar geographic area: the Midwestern U.S. I did this to remove, as much as possible, the potential of cultural or regional differences affecting the results.
Each selected state also needed to have identical or nearly
identical rules for judicial questioning under Rule 614 and
independent experts under Rule 706.
Next, I needed to select states that had variation in their
admissibility standard for expert evidence. This led me to
choose North Dakota, a state that had a Frye admissibility standard, and Nebraska, which follows Daubert.19 I also decided to
add Iowa as a third survey state, since it has a more state-specific standard in use.20 Each state met the requirement of having nearly identical Rules of Evidence 614 and 706.
Even in those selected states, I also limited the participants to
those judges who serve on the highest level of trial courts in
their state. The selection of these judges ensures not only that
the judge is using the standard state Rules of Evidence but also
that the judge may encounter civil cases of significant complexity, which may require the use of advanced fact-finding methods.
With these parameters, I created a database of eligible trialcourt judges from North Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa. Each
judge in the database received a letter asking him or her to participate in the survey, a written survey of ten questions, and a
return envelope. I followed the initial letter with a second
reminder letter several months later.
In the survey, each judge was asked about three different

17. I am aware of only one prior study that did address this issue,
finding that the admissibility standard of the home state had no
effect on judicial attitudes about decision making. Gatowski et al.,
supra note 16, at 443. For the results of this survey in this area,
see infra text accompanying note 28.
18. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1015-19 (1994). For the results of
this survey in this area, see infra Figure 6 and accompanying text.
19. Schafersman, 631 N.W.2d at 876 (Nebraska); City of Fargo v.

134 Court Review - Volume 49

methods: judicial questioning of a fact witness using Rule 614,
judicial questioning of an expert witness under Rule 614, and
judicial appointment of an independent expert under Rule
706. For each method, I asked if the judge had used the
method, and if so, how many times. If a judge had used the
method, I asked him or her to explain why, inquiring whether
it was for one or more than one point, and whether it was to
explain something contained in previous testimony or not contained within previous testimony. Then, for all judges, I asked
whether they believed the use of the method would be appropriate for either one or more than one point, and whether the
use would be appropriate either to explain something contained in previous testimony or not contained within previous
testimony. After three questions about each of the three methods, I finished with a final question asking judges to choose
among explanations for why judges are reluctant to appoint
independent experts. Judges could pick more than one answer,
or, if they did not find an explanation they wished to choose,
could also select an open-ended “other” category and then
write a response.21
I sent the survey to the 209 judges who qualified for participation, and I received responses from a total of 118 judges, for
a response rate of 56%.22
RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Having received a terrific response to the survey, my next
step was to analyze the responses of the judges, both collectively and also when grouped into different categories. The
groups included: state of origin, years of experience, gender,
and location of assignment (urban or rural). The categorical
analysis was intended to see if different groups of judges used
the advanced fact-finding methods differently.
RESPONSES OF ALL JUDGES

The first response data I reviewed regarded the general
trends in the use of advanced fact-finding techniques among
all judges. As one might expect, the use of the techniques
declined from the questioning of a fact witness, which was
quite common and frequently used, to the appointment of
independent experts, which was rarely used by most judges.
Rule 614 had been used by 84% of the judges to question a
fact witness, while a majority of 58% had used it to question an
expert. Not only did many judges use Rule 614 to question a
fact witness, but 45% of the judges had done so more than 20
times. While a majority of judges had used Rule 614 to question an expert, a much smaller number—12%—had done so
over 20 times. So even among the responses solely on the ques-

McLaughlin, 512 N.W. 2d 700, 704 (N.D. 1994).
20. Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Iowa
1999) (state committed to “liberal” standard for admissibility). A
third state standard would allow me to better understand any differences that arose between the survey groups.
21. A copy of the survey is attached as Appendix A to the complete
study. Andrew W. Jurs, Questions from the Bench and Independent
Experts: A Study of the Practices of State Court Judges, 74 U. PITT. L.
REV. 47, 81 (2012).
22. Thank you to all judges who participated.

FIGURE 1: FREQUENCY OF USE FOR EACH METHOD,
NON-USE AND MOST FREQUENT USE
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answers are the answers about issues unrelated to previous testimony (27% and 35%), and judges seem less comfortable with
using this technique to clarify testimony previously given
(12% and 12%). A visual representation of the response, as
seen in Figure 3, highlights the difference in reasons for judicial use of Rule 706, when compared to Rule 614 and Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: REASONS JUDGES HAVE USED RULE 614 TO QUESTION WITNESSES,
FACT WITNESSES AND EXPERT WITNESSES

Reason Explaining the Asking of
Questions of a Witness Using Rule 614
Percentage Who Used the Technique
for That Reason

tioning of witnesses, differences can be seen among use patterns depending on the witness. Those numbers sharply contrast to the appointment of independent experts under Rule
706. Of all of the judges, only 22% had ever appointed an independent expert. Of the 26 judges in the response group who
had done so, only 4 had done so frequently—a rate of 3.4%.
These differences can be seen in Figure 1.
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FIGURE 3: REASONS JUDGES HAVE USED RULE 706
TO APPOINT AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT
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The use patterns between Rule 614 and Rule 706 contrast
not only on the frequency of use but also on the appropriate
reasons for—and personal reasons for—the use of these methods. When asked for the reasons they had personally used Rule
614 to question a witness, judges could respond that their use
of the method was for either one or more than one point, and
that the use was to clarify either something contained within
previous testimony or not contained in previous testimony.
With these options, the use pattern was nearly identical for
questioning a fact witness and for questioning an expert.
Judges felt most comfortable with asking questions of a witness when the questioning was to clarify a discrete point contained within previous testimony. Substantial majorities of
judges who used this technique did so for this reason, with 86%
of judges doing so for fact witnesses and 87% doing so for expert
witnesses. On the other hand, judges were much less comfortable with asking witnesses questions to clarify more than one
point about something not contained within previous testimony.
Only 40% of judges using this technique for fact witnesses did
so for this reason, while only 33% did so with experts. The other
two options were in-between—more than one point contained
within previous testimony (62% fact, 70% expert) and one point
not contained within previous testimony (44% fact, 38%
expert). But in large part, the response patterns here were similar, as seen in Figure 2, and show a general downward trend as
the intrusiveness of the questioning increased.
These responses on the questioning of a witness under Rule
614 contrast with the judicial use of independent experts,
where use of the expert seems to increase along with the intrusiveness. With the use of Rule 706, a much smaller percentage
of judges appointed an independent expert for the least intrusive reason—12%—as did so for the most intrusive reason—
35%. In fact, the two responses with the largest affirmative
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When the survey asked judges about the appropriate reasons for any judge to use the techniques, instead of about their
personal use of the techniques, similar patterns emerged. For
Rule 614, large majorities agreed with using the technique for
the least intrusive reason—to clarify one point about previous
testimony (88% fact, 81% expert)—while the number declined
substantially when the intrusiveness increased—to clarify
more than one point not contained within previous testimony
(53% fact, 46% expert). But in general, the responses here, as
shown in Figure 4, show general similarities between judicial
use of Rule 614 for fact witnesses and expert witnesses, along
with a general downward trend as intrusiveness increases.
The judicial responses on appropriate reasons for any judge
to use Rule 706 to appoint an independent expert contrast
sharply with the Rule 614 responses, as they do with the
responses to questions about a judge’s personal reasons for
using the techniques. Judges were again most likely, at 40%, to
agree that it is appropriate to use an independent expert for the
most intrusive reason—to explain more than one point about
previous testimony. The percentage who thought it was approCourt Review - Volume 49 135

FIGURE 6: EXPLANATIONS FOR JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO APPOINT AN
INDEPENDENT EXPERT PURSUANT TO RULE 706
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priate did not change a lot from that intrusive reason to the
least intrusive reason—to explain one point about previous
testimony—which 37% agreed was appropriate. Again, a visual
representation of the data, contained in Figure 5, highlights
the difference in responses between judges on their responses
on Rule 706, as compared to Rule 614 and Figure 4.
FIGURE 5: REASONS JUDGES BELIEVE IT IS APPROPRIATE TO
APPOINT AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT USING RULE 706
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Most judges—77%—believed that “concern about interference with the adversarial system” explained the judicial reluctance to appoint a Rule 706 expert. Similarly, most judges—
69%—disagreed with “lack of knowledge about the procedure”
as an explanation for the lack of 706 appointments. Finally,
slim majorities agreed with “rarity of cases” and “party
experts” as the reasons, at 58% and 52.5%, respectively. And
since so many judges selected the “other” category, it bears
mentioning that many of those judges mentioned cost or payment of expert expenses as a concern.26
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After asking about Rule 614 and Rule 706, and the frequency and reasons for the use of those techniques, the survey
finished with a question asking the judges why, in general,
judges are reluctant to appoint independent experts. Both
Krafka’s and Dobbin’s work demonstrated that a significant
majority of judges would never consider appointing an independent expert,23 and I wanted to figure out why that was the
case.24 The question gave judges four options to explain their
reluctance, and judges could also select “other” and then write
a response.25 The response data for the question are contained
below, in Figure 6.

Having reviewed the response data of all judges, I also
wanted to analyze the judicial responses by category to see if
different categories of judges used these techniques differently.
First and foremost, I was curious to see if the use patterns of
these fact-finding techniques varied based on the judge’s
home-state scientific-admissibility standard. After all, these are
Daubert gatekeeping methods endorsed by Justice Breyer in
Joiner. But it could also be helpful to see if judges used the
techniques differently in any other category as well.
To these ends, I split the judges into four categories based
on: state/scientific-admissibility standard, years of experience,
gender, and location of appointment (urban or rural). I divided
the years-of-experience category into two groups of judges, one
group with ten years or less on the bench and one group with
over ten years. For location of appointment, I split judges into
rural and urban groups. Urban judges served at a location that
was the central county of a metropolitan statistical area with a
population over 200,000, based on the 2010 U.S. Census
Data.27 Each categorical subset contained at least 16 judges.
Analysis of the responses demonstrated few differences

23. See text accompanying notes 9 & 12.
24. The age of the prior study in this area, done by Cecil and Willging,
suggested an updated analysis of the issue would be helpful. Cecil
& Willging, supra note 18, at 1004 (surveys given to judges in
1988).
25. Each of the four options is derived from the prior study in the
area. Cecil & Willging, supra note 18, at 1015-19. Judges were
also instructed that they could choose more than one option, if

they wished to do so.
26. Presumably this is because expert-witness fees under Rule 706 are
often only taxable as expenses at the end of the litigation, while
expert-witness fees are usually due upon receipt. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 706(c)(2).
27. For this database, the urban locations include: Cedar Rapids, IA;
Davenport, IA; Des Moines, IA; Fargo, ND; Lincoln, NE; and
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA.
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Other

between responses in most categories. While I was curious to
see if the state admissibility standard affected the use of these
techniques, I could find almost no statistically significant differences between the judges.28 As a result, I can only conclude
that the judge’s state admissibility standard has little effect on
the use of these fact-finding techniques, whether or not they
were approved for Daubert gatekeeping.
The years-of-experience and gender categories also lacked
many differences in use patterns. For gender, I could find no
statistically significant difference between men and women for
use, frequency of use, or reasons for use of the advanced factfinding techniques. For years of experience, most categories of
analysis also yielded no differences. The sole statistically significant difference I could find between the more- and lessexperienced judges was on whether they had ever appointed
an independent expert. In the more-experienced group, 29% of
judges had appointed a Rule 706 expert, while only 12.5% of
the less-experienced judges had done so. Considering that a
majority of judges believe independent-expert cases are rare,29
if that is true we would expect to see judges with fewer years
on the bench have fewer opportunities to appoint a 706 expert.
The data do support that result.
Even if the state admissibility standard, the gender, or the
years of experience showed few differences, I could find several statistically significant differences between urban and
rural judges. As compared to their urban colleagues, rural
judges gave different responses on the reasons for their own
personal use of—and for the appropriate reasons for any
judge’s use of—Rule 614 to question a fact witness. Rural
judges were more likely to have used Rule 614 to question a
fact witness to “explain more than one point about previous
testimony,” with 69% of judges having done so compared to
45% among their urban counterparts. When asked about reasons any judge might ask questions of a fact witness, 94% of
rural judges thought it was appropriate to “clarify a discrete
point contained within previous testimony,” while only 76% of
urban judges agreed. Both of these differences are statistically
significant. Finally, on the use of Rule 706, there was also a difference that merits mention. When asked for the reason they
had personally used a Rule 706 expert, 42% of rural judges
said they had done so to “explain more than one point about
previous testimony.” In contrast, there were no urban judges
who had done so for this reason.30
When I analyzed the response data, I found that—for the
most part—judicial use of advanced fact-finding methods does
not vary based on the judges’ characteristics. For gender, years
of experience, and state admissibility standard, this is true with
minor exceptions. The other category—urban and rural

28. The sole exception was a minor difference in responses between
Iowa (state-specific standard) and Nebraska (Daubert) on whether
judges had ever used independent experts. Jurs, supra note 21, at
67 n. 66.
29. See supra Figure 6.
30. There is an issue here, though, of the variability of the numbers
due to low sample size. As a result, the difference here—42%—
does not quite meet the threshold for statistical significance. See
Jurs, supra note 21, at 75 n. 76. Clearly, a larger sample size would

judges—showed variation on several points, with statistically
significant differences between the response groups.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The Midwest judicial survey provides insight into judicial
use of advanced fact-finding techniques in the modern era,
updating and expanding upon previous studies in the area.
First, the study updates the prior surveys in the area, which
had relied on judicial responses collected no later than 1999.
Krafka’s study of federal judges in the 1990s provided insight
into the case-management practices of federal judges, while
Dobbin’s study did the same with state-court judges. Yet each
relied on surveys administered during the Daubert trilogy,
before the transition of many states to a Daubert gatekeeping
standard, and before the application of Daubert to nonscientific
expertise testimony after Kumho. This survey therefore provides a much-needed update to the prior work, measuring the
case-management practices of state-court judges now that
Daubert gatekeeping is more firmly established.31
In providing that update, the results obtained are quite similar to the prior studies. In Krafka, 74% of federal judges would
not appoint a Rule 706 expert, and in Dobbin, 57% of judges
would not do so. In this survey 78% of judges had never
appointed an independent expert. The results are also similar
on the issue of witness questioning.32 With this survey, we can
see the current patterns for the use of advanced fact-finding
techniques and can observe that they have not changed drastically since the 1990s.
Second, the survey provides the only data since Daubert on
why judges are reluctant to appoint independent experts. In a
1988 survey, Cecil and Willging asked judges why they were
reluctant to appoint Rule 706 experts.33 In their work, a majority of judges (62%) responded that the rarity of appropriate
cases explained that reluctance, while less than half (48%)
agreed it was the adversarial system.34 The response data from
this survey contrast with these prior results. A large majority
of judges in this survey (77%) felt it was adversarial norms that
explained reluctance to appoint, while a much smaller majority (58%) selected rarity of cases. These results show a clear
difference in responses to explain judicial reluctance to
appoint Rule 706 experts, suggesting further study is warranted to further understand the issue. In addition, if judges
believe—as this survey suggests—that adversarial norms
explain reluctance of judges to use Rule 706, it suggests the
rule will remain largely unused. Policymakers might wish to
decide if having a “moot” rule is appropriate, or if changes
should be made to reinvigorate or otherwise modify the rule.
Next, in analyzing the data, we can learn several lessons

clarify if this result is statistically significant or a result of sampling only.
31. Dobbin specifically mentioned the need for further evaluation of
the management practices of state-court judges, now that Daubert
has become so prevalent. Dobbin, supra note 9, at 14.
32. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text.
33. Cecil & Willging, supra note 18, at 1015-18.
34. Id.
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about judicial management of complex evidence using these
techniques. The survey responses demonstrate an inverse relationship between likelihood of the use of Rule 614 and the
intrusiveness of the reasons for use, so that as the questions
become more intrusive, judges are less likely to personally use
the rule and are less likely to believe it is appropriate for other
judges to do so. Yet for Rule 706, the pattern is different.
Judges are more likely to have personally used an independent
expert for the most intrusive inquiries, namely, those about
more than one point not contained within previous testimony.
The same is true for judges’ opinions about appropriate reason
for other judges to appoint a 706 expert. These responses
demonstrate different use patterns for the two different techniques measured.
Another interesting result from analyzing the data is the
relationship between a state’s expert-admissibility standard and
a judge’s use of these techniques. These techniques, after all,
were specifically endorsed for Daubert gatekeeping by Justice
Breyer in Joiner. Yet when we examine judicial use of these
Daubert techniques, we see that the use of the methodologies
is basically the same between judges with a home-state standard of Daubert and those with other standards.35 The data
therefore affirm a finding from earlier studies: that the power
of Daubert was not in the way specific issues are handled, but
rather in the system-wide increase in scrutiny of scientific or
other expert evidence.36

Finally, when the responses were broken into different categories, the responses of urban and rural judges demonstrated
the most differences. I am not aware of any similar findings in
other studies, and I see this as a new finding warranting further research. The question of the nature of judging in urban
and rural areas, and the differences between those areas, is one
that would be quite interesting and could have significant policy implications as well.
By measuring the actual practices of state-court judges, this
study provides insight into what is actually occurring in the
courtroom today, how judges perform their assigned duties,
and whether those methods are as useful as the Supreme Court
had suggested.

35. Supra text accompanying note 28.

36. See, e.g., Krafka, supra note 6, at 322; Gatowski, supra note 16, at
443.
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